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Abstract: This paper discusses the Han-Hui ethnic conflicts during the 19th century 
in Yunnan, China. Between 1821 and 1856 a series of ethnic riots took place between 
the dominant Han Chinese and the Hui, a Muslim ethnic group in Yunnan. This 
paper attempts to explain how the Hui’s blended identity as both Chinese and 
Muslims caused the two ethnic group’s misconceptions of each other, and how these 
misconceptions were reinforced by the nation-building efforts of Imperial China. 
This paper also sheds lights on the contemporary ethnic relationship on China’s 
western frontier. 
 







I. Ethnic violence in Yunnan, 1821—1856 (Wang 1974, 351-52) 
 







III. Hui Muslims in Yunnan, photographed in the backyard of a local Mosque,  circa 1880. 
 
 
IV. The name seal of Panthay Rebellion leader Du Wenxiu, on which both titles in 
Chinese and Arabic are presented. The Chinese title reads “Generalissimo of all Armies and 







 The Ethnic Violence and the Making of Chinese Muslim Identity  
Illustrations 
Map of Yunnan, 19th Century            (2) 
Dispersion of Muslim Communities in 19th-Century China     (2) 
A Typical Hui Community in Yunnan         (3) 
The Name Seal of Generalissimo Du Wenxiu        (3) 
Du Wenxiu’s “Situation of Manchu Dynasty” Graph       (43) 
 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction               (5) 
II. An Overview of Han-Hui Interactions in History       (10) 
- Historiography of Chinese Muslim Studies        (10) 
- The Hui: An Ethnoreligious Group         (14) 
- Neither “Us” nor “Them”: The Hui’s Ambiguous Identity     (21) 
- The Hui’s Clash with An Emerging Chinese Nation      (26) 
III. The Panthay Rebellion and Ethnic Reconstruction      (30) 
- The Panthay Rebellion: A Historical Overview       (30) 
- The Ethnic Makeup of the Panthay Rebellion        (36) 
- Constructing the Panthay Ideology         (40) 
- The Political Institution of the Panthay State       (47) 
IV. Conclusion               (49) 









 I. Introduction 
The year 1821 was a memorable year for China. Prince Minning, after a 
grandiose ceremony of succession, ascended the throne and became the sixth 
emperor of the Qing Dynasty. When the whole empire was celebrating the 
anointment of the new ruler, a brawl among miners in the western province of 
Yunnan seemed but a trivial episode. On April 15, 1821, a Han Chinese worker, Xu 
Shixiong, defecated in front of the mining camp of Ma Liangcai, a Muslim foreman. 
Xu was immediately caught by Ma’s fellow workers, who beat him publicly with a 
rod. This trivial dispute suddenly agitated the anti-Muslim sentiment among Han 
Chinese miners. Within two days three hundred Han workers gathered in a 
Buddhist temple to prepare for revenge actions, while two hundred Muslims, in 
response, took up arms to defend themselves in a local mosque. 1  A bloody 
confrontation between Han Chinese and Muslims occurred on the night of April 17th , 
which resulted in 23 people dead and hundreds wounded on both sides. The 
unexpected escalation of the situation confused the Governor of Yunnan, who asked, 
in his memorial to the Emperor, “why did a trivial dispute like this evolved into a 
large-scale unrest?”2 
The riot in the Baiyang silver mine was only one example of frequent ethnic 
conflicts between Han Chinese and the Hui people, a Muslim ethnic minority native 
                                                                 
1 The Governorate of Yunnan and the Judicial Commissioner’ s Office  of Yunnan (1821), The Court Record 
of the Armed Fight between Han and Hui in Baiyangchang (Baiyangchang Han-Hui Xiedouan 白羊廠漢回
械鬥案), Yunnan Provincial Library. Retreived August 20, 2013 






 to Yunnan Province, in the early 19th century. Large-scale riots also occurred in 1800, 
1839 and 1845 respectively, each with increasing violence and degree of organization. 
In 1800, Han bandits in Mianning County raided the local Muslim community and 
killed over 170 Hui Muslim families. The Muslims responded with a counterattack 
several months later. In 1821, a verbal altercation between two Han and Muslim 
young men evolved into a full-scale attack on the Muslim neighborhood in Baoshan, 
resulting in the massacre of 400 Hui Muslim households.3 In 1845, a troop of Han 
Chinese militia backed by local magistrates stormed the Muslim community in Dali 
City and caused over 1400 casualties. 4  The degree of violence in these riots 
surpassed most civil unrests in 19th-century China. 
The series of ethnic conflicts finally triggered a massive rebellion of Hui Muslim 
people, known as Panthay Rebellion in history. In 1856, several thousands of Hui 
people took up arms and occupied the City of Dali, the political center of Western 
Yunnan. The Muslim rebels marched eastward and sieged the provincial capital 
Kunming and founded a separatist regime called the “Pingnan State”. The imperial 
Governor Shuxinga committed suicide after losing control over the province. The 
Hui Muslim regime consistently fought with the imperial army in the following two 
decades and ended up decisively defeated by the imperial army in 1871. 
                                                                 
3 Lin Quan. 2006. “Du wen xiu qi yi yan jiu” 杜文秀起義研究 (A Research on Du Wenxiu Rebellion). Kun 
ming: Yun nan min zu chu ban she. (The Chine se academia no consensus of the actual number of Hui 
casualty; this article chooses the commonly referred statistics in academic works). 63.  
4 Lin Quan. 2006. “Du wen xiu qi yi yan jiu” 杜文秀起義研究 (A Research on Du Wenxiu Rebellion). Kun 






 This study explores the cause of ethnic unrests in the 19th century Yunnan from 
the perspective of identity politics. It begins with exploring the development of the 
Hui Muslims’ self-perception in the historical context. The Hui descended from 
Persian-speaking Inner Asian immigrants who came to China during the Mongol 
Conquest in the 13th century. In their 600-year interaction with the Chinese society, 
two major tendencies heavily impacted the formation of a distinctive Hui identity: 
first, their desire to justify their status as legitimate Chinese subjects by assimilating 
Chinese customs and culture; second, their hope to preserve their Islamic heritage by 
distinguishing themselves from the dominant Han Chinese with their Muslim 
practices. The Hui struggled to retain their ancestral identity as Muslims while gain 
recognition as Chinese in the society. Many Hui scholars made efforts to reinforce 
the internal consistency between Islam and Confucianism by applying Confucian 
principles to explain Islamic concepts. The Hui viewed their cultural assimilation not 
as a betrayal of Muslim principles, but rather as a necessary compromise to justify 
their practice of Islam in the Han-dominated society.  
Next, this paper discusses how the Hui’s historical evolution shaped their 
contemporary identity in 19th-century China. On one hand, most Hui people 
adopted a significant portion of Chinese traditions and showed little difference from 
neighboring Han Chinese in language, appearance, family structure and secular 
lifestyle. On the other hand, their religion played the central role in defining their 






 shared religious belief and cultural practice created a strong group identity that 
united them into ethnic enclaves and separated them from the surrounding Han 
neighborhoods. The Hui’s partial assimilation to Chinese culture and their religious 
heritage as Muslims created ambiguity for their ethnic status in the Chinese society. 
This paper then shows how the Hui’s blended identity conflicted with the ethnic 
norm of Han Chinese society. The Han’s traditional view of ethnicity, a binary 
division of all human beings into “civilized (Hua)” and “barbarians (yi)” categories 
based on their degree of civilization. The Han Chinese were considered as “civilized” 
and a superior group destined to rule, while all non-Han populace was viewed as 
“barbarians” subjected to rule. The imperial courts of Ming and Qing Dynasties 
adopted different governing policies toward Han and non-Han peoples based on 
this binary categorization. The Han-inhabited regions were governed directly by the 
Imperial mandarins appointed by the emperor, while the non-Han population were 
allowed to retain their own customary rules and were governed indirectly through 
indigenous tribal chiefs. Yunnan, a border province with a significant non-Han 
population, was the most significant example of this differentiated governing policy.  
The rapid increase of the ethnic Hui population in 19th-century Yunnan posed a 
great challenge to the Chinese view of ethnicity and the empire’s governing 
strategies. The Hui did not fit comfortably into either ethnic category. Their 
considerable degree of assimilation made them distinct from indigenous peoples 






 them from integrating into the Han community. The blended characteristics of Hui 
ethnicity defied the existing order of ethno-cultural hierarchy in Yunnan by blurring 
the boundary between the Han and the non-Han. The internal solidarity and 
self-segregation of Hui Muslim neighborhoods further raised suspicion and anxiety 
from outside. Many Han documents in the 19th century condemned the “weird” 
cultural practices of the Hui and depicted the group as foreign, disobedient and 
disloyal. The Han society’s prejudice against Hui cultural practice contributed to the 
ethnic violence in Yunnan. 
The outbreak of Panthay Rebellion in 1857 was the Hui Muslim’s radical response 
to the mass violence generated by this identity conflict. The establishment of a 
Hui-led regime not only attempted to reshape the Hui’s identity, but also to 
overthrow the ethnic norm in the province. The Hui leadership underplayed their 
Muslim ancestry and claimed their unquestionable status as Chinese. The rebels 
questioned the legitimacy of the ruling Qing Dynasty and claimed their 
responsibility as Chinese to save their nation from the barbaric Manchu rule. The 
Panthay Leaders invited the Han Chinese to join the new regime and declared that 
Hui and Han, instead of fighting each other, should unite for their shared struggle 
against Qing suppression. These policies undermined the ethnic norm in Yunnan 
which revealed the Hui as a group hostile to Han Chinese, and consolidated the 
Hui’s legitimate status living in the Chinese-dominated society. 






 Yunnan. It does not aim to examine every specific detail of this historical event, but 
only to provide some limited insights into the ethnic disturbance faced by Imperial 
China during its political transition to modern statehood. In this paper, “Hui people” 
and “Chinese Muslims” are sometimes used interchangeably to reconcile the 
different terminology in the Western academia. 
II. An Overview of Han-Hui Interactions in History 
Historiography of Chinese Muslim Studies 
Since the late 19th century, Western missionaries and scholars have been 
discussing the hostile confrontation between the Han and Hui peoples. Emile Rocher 
(1886) takes an economic perspective and argues that the struggle for economic 
control over Yunnan’s mineral resources raised the nationalist sentiment of the Han 
and Hui residents. Bromhall (1900) develops this economic view by arguing that 
China’s modernization created the urgent need for raw materials and attracted 
massive Han immigrants to the resource-abundant Yunnan. The new immigrants’ 
failure to compete with the experienced Muslim miners intensified the ethnic 
resentment between the two groups and triggered the conflict. However, this theory 
cannot explain race riots that occurred in major cities like Baoshan and Dali in which 
most perpetrators were local farmers in little contact with Hui community. Also, the 
first record of small-scale skirmishes between Han and Hui residents dates back to 







 In Chinese academia, many scholars also explain the ethnic conflicts from a 
socio-economic perspective. Mainstream Chinese historians portray the ethnic 
incidents as an inevitable class conflict between an ethnic underclass and oppressive 
Han Chinese landlords. Bai Shouyi (1976) argues that “the Hui Rebellion is not 
ethnic in nature, but a revolution of the suppressed Hui masses against the 
exploitive landlords and gentry.”5 Lin (1991) interprets the anti-Muslim sentiment as 
a propaganda strategy used by Manchu rulers to maintain their shattering rule on 
the frontier. Lin argues that by inciting racial hatred against Muslims, Yunnan 
residents would turn their discontent of the Imperial Court toward a vulnerable 
ethnic minority. Although this interpretation is not entirely false, it overly 
exaggerates the economic disparity between the Han and Hui peoples. In fact, the 
Hui are the most prosperous ethnic group among all ethnic minorities in Yunnan. 
The Hui people traditionally engaged in lucrative occupations such as mining and 
the caravan trade, which made them generally better-off than most Han Chinese 
peasants. Ironically, it is the economic success and prosperity of the Hui that made 
Han Chinese describe their propensity as “full of strength, fierce and combative”.6 
Other scholars focus on the ethnic roots of the Han-Hui hostility and explain the 
unrests, as being caused by cultural misconceptions between two ethnicities. Wang 
Shuhuai (1980) argues that “the misunderstanding between the Han and the Hui, 
                                                                 
5 Bai Shouyi & Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1951. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The Muslim Rebellion). Shanghai: 
Shen chou kuo kuang she., Preface. 
6 David Atwill. 2005. The Chinese sultanate: Islam, ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in southwest China,  






 was originally based on mutual enmity and hostility, beginning with simple 
misconceptions and discord and then eventually evolving into a battle between the 
two groups.”7 He also explains that the court officials’ failure to reconcile ethnic 
relations “was compounded by government officials improperly handling the 
situation, causing the Hui to hate the Han and oppose the officials.” 8 
In the 21th century, Atwill’s research (2006) makes great contributions to the 
field by discussing the incompatible identities of the Han and Hui. Atwill argues 
that the Han-Hui ethnic riots were caused by the two groups’ different conceptions 
of the ethnic hierarchy in Yunnan. The Han residents perceived Yunnan’s ethnic 
makeup as a “binary dualism” which divided the entire population into the 
“civilized” and the “barbarians”. The Hui people distinguished themselves from 
both categories and created a dilemma for the Han society to understand and 
recognize their identity. The Hui behaved as Han Chinese in language, appearance 
and lifestyle, but their adherence to Islam and Islam-related customs distinguished 
them from the Han majority and marked their ethnic uniqueness. Their cultural 
similarity to the Han and their distinctive Islamic practice formed a dual identity 
“betwixt and between” different ethnic categories. Their distinctive religious practice 
raised misconceptions of the Han and caused the large-scale violence in the 19 th 
century. 
                                                                 
7 Bai Shouyi & Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1951. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The Muslim Rebellion). Shanghai: 







 Atwill’s work starts a new approach in exploring the roots of 19th-century 
Han-Hui ethnic hostility. His analytical framework, however, is not free from 
theoretical problems. Atwill’s studies mainly focus on the Han’s perception of Hui 
cultural differences and how the Han’s ethnic prejudices evolved into large-scale 
violence against the Muslim minority. The 19th century ethnic conflicts were not 
initiated unilaterally by the Han against the Hui, but resulted from mutual 
misconception between the two groups. This paper aims to reveal how the Hui 
minority viewed the dominant Han Chinese and their own cultural uniqueness in a 
Han-dominated society.  
Most previous studies only focus on the two groups’ contemporary hostilities in 
the 19th century, but ignore the long-term development of Han-Hui relationship in 
history. Since the first arrival of Muslims in China over 600 years ago, the Hui has 
been interacting with the Han Chinese. The pattern of interaction and conflicts 
between the two ethnic groups was a long-term evolutionary process and underwent 
several changes and adjustments. It is important, therefore, to examine how the 
historical precedent influenced the Han-Hui mutual distrust in the 19 th century.  
Previous studies also rarely investigate Han-Hui ethnic conflicts in a larger 
national context. The Hui were not an isolated ethnic group local to Yunnan, but a 
transnational ethnic group widely scattered in western China and northern Burma. 
Due to their professions in trade, the Hui had a considerable degree of mobility and 






 border through caravan gangs, mosques and madrasahs. As early as the 1860s, 
western observers noted that the Han-Hui violence in Yunnan was linked to the 
widespread Muslim unrest in Western China since the 1820s. Indeed, many Hui 
immigrants from outer provinces played a significant role in the ethnic riots in 
Yunnan by initiating the controversies and intensifying the ongoing conflicts.  This 
paper will attempt to complement previous studies by addressing these questions. 
The Hui: An Ethnoreligious Group 
To understand the ethnic identity of the Hui people, it is important to examine 
how this ethnic group was formed in history. The ancestors of the Hui people 
arrived in China as soldiers and retinues of the Mongol Khan during the 
Sino-Mongol war of 1294.9 The early Chinese Muslims were a heterogeneous group 
of immigrants with diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds. It took nearly three 
hundred years, from the late 13th century to the mid-16th century, for the cultural 
integration to take place and transform early Muslims into a unitary ethnic group. 
The intermarriage among Muslim immigrants weakened their ties with their 
national origin and created a new ethnic community of hybrid lineage. The Hui is 
commonly believed to have evolved as a homogeneous group during Ming Dynasty 
(1368-1644).10 Vernacular Chinese replaced Persian to become the Muslims’ new 
lingua franca , and the distinctive physical features of Middle Easterners gradually 
                                                                 
9 Marshall Broomhall. 1966. “Islam in China: A neglected problem”, New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp, 
p.77. 
10 Liu Yingsheng, “Hui Zu Yu Yan 800 Nian Jian Yao Hui Gu: Cong Bo Si Yu Dao ‘Hui Zu Han Yu’ ”, Zhong 






 vanished due to their increasing intermarriage with the Chinese and the conversion 
of new members. More importantly, the term Huihui was gradually accepted by both 
the Muslims and the rest of society as the standard name for the ethno-religious 
group of Middle Eastern descent. 11 
The formation of the Hui ethnic group is closely associated with the acculturation 
process of Muslims in China. The Muslims’ adoption of Chinese language and 
customs became the common ground on which a new Hui identity was built. In the 
Ming Dynasty, most Hui males had customarily adopted a Chinese-style name 
(guanming) and used it more frequently than their Arabic-style religious name 
(jingming).12 Public records also show that many Hui studied Confucian classics and 
participated in imperial examinations for public service. The integration had 
alienated the Hui from their remote ancestral lineage and strengthened their new 
group status as a Chinese ethnic minority. The Hui became to identify themselves as 
“Muslim Chinese (mum‘in)” or “Hui Chinese (hui’min)” rather than merely Muslims 
residing in China. 13 Their “Chineseness” became a symbol of Hui group identity 
that distinguished them from other Muslim ethnic groups in Central Asia. 
Besides the Hui’s adoption of Chinese customs, a more positive form of cultural 
assimilation also took place. The Muslims interpreted their unique religious and 
                                                                 
11 Liu Yingsheng, “Hui Zu Yu Yan 800 Nian Jian Yao Hui Gu: Cong Bo Si Yu Dao  ‘Hui Zu Han Yu’ ”, Zhong 
Guo Wen Hua Yan Jiu, Vol. 4, 2008. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Atwill, D. G. 2005. The Chinese sultanate: Islam, ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in southwest China, 






 cultural practices with traditional Chinese concepts. The Hui attempted to prove that 
being Muslim was not necessarily being “foreign” and antithetical to Chinese society. 
The Huihui Yuanlai, a mythical book that described the early history of the Hui, 
attempts to justify the arrival of Muslims in China in a traditional Chinese context: 
 
In the third year of Zhenguan of the Tang Dynasty, on the thirteenth 
day of the third month, the Emperor in his sleep dreamed of a man with 
a turban on his head, chasing a monster that had rushed into the palace. 
Upon waking, the Emperor was disturbed in his mind, not perceiving 
the significance of the portent.  
He summoned the Court by a stroke on the golden bell, and all civil 
and military officials took place before him. Thereupon the Interpreter 
of Dreams stepped out of the ranks and said: “this man is a 
Mohammedan of the West. Far beyond Jiayuguan there is a 
Mohammedan king of lofty mind and great virtue…… As to a plan for 
the present, throw open the pass, and request a sage from the 
Mohammedan king to be sent to deal with the threatened evils, that the 
country may be kept at rest! 14 
 
The storyline of the “turbaned man” clearly resembles the tale of Buddhism’s 
introduction into China in 64 A.D., in which the the Emperor Ming of the Han 
Dynasty dreamed of a golden Buddha from the West. The Muslim author of this tale 
desired to create an origin for Islam as noble and remarkable as Buddhism, a 
well-respected yet “foreign” religion in China. Such origin stories intended to prove 
that the coming of Muslims, just as Buddhists and Taoists, was predicted and 
welcomed in the earlier Chinese history and never conflicted with the established 
culture of the Han society. 
                                                                 







 Many Muslim scholars also attempted to reinforce the internal consistency 
between Islam and Confucianism by applying Confucian doctrines and terms to 
interpreting Islamic theology. The earliest Chinese translation of the Quran, 
published in 1724, borrowed a large number of Buddhist and Confucian terms to 
represent Islamic concepts. For example, the word “God” was translated as zhenzhu, 
a Buddhist word for “legitimate ruler”; the word “Prophet (Mohammed)” was 
represented by shengren, an honorific originally reserved for Confucius. 15 Another 
effort was made by Muslim Chinese scholars, known as “yi ru quan jing,” to use 
Confucian moral principles to substantiate the truthfulness of Islamic works. Wang 
Daiyu, a prominent Muslim scholar, claimed that “Islam and the Analects of 
Confucius are internally one.”16 Other scholars, like the famous Hui theologian Liu 
Zhi, argued in their works that Islam perfectly complements and improves the truth 
developed by Confucians. The extensive use of Chinese cultural elements to adapt 
Islam was an effort made by Hui scholars to give their ethnic features a legitimate 
place in Chinese society.  
However, the Hui’s assimilation of Chinese customs should be viewed as a 
process of creating a new distinctive identity rather than replacing their ethnic 
uniqueness. Their adoption of some “Chineseness” never downplayed their strong 
desire to preserve their religious and cultural traditions in a non-Muslim society. 
                                                                 
15 Liu Jielian (Liu zhi). 1724. [reprinted 1975, Taiwan]. Tian fang zhi sheng shi lu. Taibei: Guang wen shu ju 







 Islam, the common religion of the Hui community, played the central role in 
defining their ethnic identity and distinguishing them from the Han. A 1827 imperial 
memorial reported that “a Han becomes a Hui when he joins the Hui’s religion.”17 A 
17th-century Muslim textbook also confirmed the religious characteristic of the ethnic 
group that “the Han and the Hui were mainly distinguished…by their different 
religious teachings (jiao).”18 The most customary differences of the Hui ethnicity 
were those stipulated in Islam, such as the prohibition of pork, male circumcision, 
five prayers in a day, and special religious clothing. The Hui’s preservation of Islam 
and Islamic culture in their long shared history marked their different identity from 
the Han majority. 
The long-term interaction between Hui Muslims and Han Chinese determined 
the cultural traits of the Hui ethnic group in 19th-century Yunnan. According to the 
travel records of several Christian missionaries, The Hui Yunnanese were a highly 
sinicized ethnicity whose physical appearance and secular lifestyle seemed to show 
little difference with the Han Chinese. Their body features were “indistinguishable 
from the Chinese” and their apparel “follow[ed] the Chinese fashion.”19 Despite the 
Hui’s apparent similarities with the Han, some missionaries note showed that the 
                                                                 
17 Li Dianrong 2007. “Du Wenxiu's Appeal to Beijing in the Daoguang Reign”, Studies in Qing History, 
2008(4). Original Text in Mandarin: “滇之回民，多由漢民化成。” 
18 Ma Changshou. 2009. Ma Changshou min zu shi yan jiu zhu zuo xuan. Shanghai: Shanghai ren min chu ban 
she. 







 Hui was a distinctive ethnic group “whose blood and traditions were blended.” 20 
The Western surveyors in the 19th century generally summarized three unique 
aspects of Hui Muslims in Yunnan: 
First, the strong internal cohesion of Hui neighborhoods. The Muslims 
population was widely spread throughout the province, but almost all Huis lived 
within ethnic communities isolated by the surrounding Han area. A typical Hui 
community was centered with a mosque where the community members assembled 
for prayer and public meetings. The religious clergy (ackhoond or a-hong) served as 
the religious and community leaders who made important decisions and settled 
disputes among Muslim residents. 21 Their shared religion played an important part 
in the Hui’s group identity and served as the cohesive force by which the whole 
Muslim neighborhood was united. An anonymous Christian clergyman identified 
this feature as the main obstacle for their missionary work, since he noted that 
Muslims applying for baptism would be “spat on the street by their peers and forced 
to hold back.”22 The boundary between the Hui community and the nearby Han 
villages was clear and visible, and any action to infringe upon this border could be 
considered an aggression. 
The second feature of Hui Muslim life was their specialization in certain 
occupations. The majority of Han Chinese engaged in agricultural cultivation. Most 
                                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 阿訇/阿洪 for Akhood in Mandarin Chinese. –Author’s note 







 members of rural Han populations were self-sufficient farmers who possessed or 
rented small plots of land for sustenance. In contrast, the Hui population was known 
for their specialization in long-distance trade and mining. A European interviewee 
reported that “the mafou (muleteers) were almost all Muslim, so as the soldier 
escorts......It was by [a Muslim muleteer] that I obtained much information about the 
commerce in Yunnan.”23 Another traveler ’s source recorded that two thirds of the 
caravan trade on the route connecting Yunnan and Burma was operated by the 
Panthays (Chinese Muslims). Due to the harsh climate and dangerous road 
conditions in Southwest China, the Hui caravan traders earned the reputation for 
being “rugged in constitution and resolute in spirit to endure hardships and 
dangers”24. The Hui were also talented miners who had been the first to exploit the 
lucrative resources of Yunnan. Emile Rocher, a French Jesuit missionary, recorded 
the Muslims’ industriousness to “produce high quality products using primitive 
techniques.”25 A common saying in Yunnan that “there is no mine where there is no 
Hui” also confirmed the group’s engagement in mining. 
The third characteristic of the Hui is their high mobility beyond the provincial 
border. The Muslims’ specialization in trade required them to travel frequently 
between Yunnan and adjacent regions including Tibet, Burma, Guizhou and 
                                                                 
23 Marshall Broomhall, 1966. “Islam in China: A neglected problem”, New York: Paragon Book Reprint 
Corp., p.110 
24 David Atwill. The Chinese sultanate: Islam, ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in southwest China, 
1856-1873. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, p.40. 






 Szechuan. In a 1821 census report, the county of Baoshan hosted over 300 
households of Hui immigrants from Shaanxi, most of whom travelled to the 
province for caravan business. The long-distance travelers also effectively 
strengthened the interactions between Hui communities beyond the provincial 
border. A memorial to Yunnan’s imperial prosecutor in 1763 noted that “[the 
Muslims] formed groups within themselves and convey messages between each 
other like a clique”. 26  Since the Hui population was scattered across a wide 
geographic range, caravan traders and muleteers played the important role of 
maintaining the network between Hui neighborhoods in different areas. The high 
mobility of Hui tradesman effectively connected scattered Hui diasporas into a truly 
transregional group. 
 Neither Us nor Them: The Hui’s Ambiguous Identity 
Why did the Hui, a Muslim ethnic group with a high degree of assimilation, 
become the target of ethnic violence in Yunnan between 1821 and 1856? We cannot 
fully understand the reason unless we clearly examine the traditional Chinese view 
of ethnicity. Previous scholars (Wang, 1976; Lin, 2000; and Atwill, 2006) noted that 
Chinese society’s classification of ethnicity is a dichotomy of the Hua  (“civilized”) 
and Yi (“barbarians”) according to a group’s adoption of Chinese culture. The Hua  
referred to those who observed Confucian moral principles and behaved culturally 
                                                                 







 as Chinese; the Yi referred to those “barbarous” groups whose rituals and customs 
did not reach the Confucian standard of “civilization .” One’s ethnic status was 
mainly determined by one’s cultural identity rather than one’s ancestral lineage. The 
imperial house of Qing Dynasty, a non-Han Altaic ethnic clan originated in 
Manchuria, was considered culturally “civilized” due to their voluntary assimilation 
into Chinese culture. The Hua-Yi ethnic distinction assumed a cultural hierarchy 
which confirmed the superiority of Confucian civilization over non-Han traditions. 
Since the mid-Qing Dynasty, the ethnic policy in multiethnic Yunnan was 
predominantly shaped by the Hua-Yi distinction. The Han residents were directly 
governed by the imperial governor. The population control system (bianhu) required 
every Han household (minren) to report their family size, occupations and land 
property to the local registrar. 27  The non-Han indigenous groups, such as the 
Hmong, Yi, Bai and Tibetans, were granted considerable autonomy due to their 
unfamiliarity with Chinese law. The Imperial Court issued patents to local chiefs and 
authorized them to govern the indigenous clans according to their respective ethnic 
traditions. This differentiated ethnic policy often resulted in the disparity of legal 
enforcements: in the same region, a Han Chinese perpetrator was subject to strict 
Imperial penal codes, whereas an ethnic Yi criminal was only punishable by more 
lenient customary laws in his native clan.  
The rapid growth of Hui Yunnanese population in the nineteenth century posed 
                                                                 






 a great challenge to the traditional Chinese view of ethnicity in terms of both social 
perception and governance. The estimation of Hui Yunnanese population in 1800 
ranged from 10% - 30% (Atwill, 2006) to over 40% (Clark, 1910) of the total 
population, a percentage hardly negligible by the dominant Han society and the 
local government. The Hui’s familiarity with Chinese customs enabled them to have 
frequent contacts with the Han population. Unlike the secluded lifestyle of 
indigenous peoples in the landlocked mountainous area, the Hui’s highly mobile 
occupation as traders, muleteers and miners made their cultural difference more 
conspicuous to the public. Their exotic Muslim customs confused the Han residents, 
who produced several stereotypes to interpret their weird behavior. One common 
misconception is that the Hui avoided eating pork because they believed themselves 
descended from pigs. This rumor was so prevalent in Yunnan that the Hui 
neighborhood in the capital Kunming was even called Zhuji Jie (Pig Assembling 
Street)28 . Their religion was also faced with various mistaken stereotypes. The 
recount of Wang Dingan, a Yunnanese scholar-bureaucrat, provided a typical 
sinocentric view of “Hui-hui religion”: 
Concerning their religion, the Hui always worship and revere their 
demon god. They are encouraged to wage a pilgrimage to the tomb of 
their religious master [Mohammad], regardless of the length of 
distance. Their holy land, also known as Mecca, is eight thousand li 
west of Yunnan. Although the Hui has been staying in China for long, 
they still adhere to this foreign custom and refuse to change……”29 
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 The Hui’s blended identity as both Chinese and Muslims also incurred 
remarkable controversy. Their degree of assimilation in secular life made them 
sufficiently qualified as Han Chinese, but their distinctive religious customs 
apparently conflicted with the authentic cultural standards of Han-dominated 
Chinese society. Their insistence on certain “foreign” traditions raised questions why 
they did not adopt the “civilized” lifestyle without reservation. Lu Guohua, a 
provincial-level bureaucrat, expressed his concerns with the Hui’s Islamic practices 
in the following report to the emperor: 
The Hui has been residing in China for such a long time and have 
no difference with the Chinese in many aspects. They are supposed to 
observe the customs of the Celestial Empire. However, I find that the 
Hui consider 360 days as a year, and they secretly designate a certain 
day as the beginning of their year. They also prefer the white color in 
their daily life and wear a weird white cap all day. I don’t even 
understand why they wear it and what deity they worship…… 
 
I hereby recommend Your Majesty to order the Hui to follow the 
authentic standard of clothing and ban all Mosques. Please make it a 
crime for the wearing of a white cap and the use of private calendars.30 
Lu’s recommendation, along with many proposals to regulate the Hui’s 
undesirable customs, reflected the government’s uneasiness toward the Hui’s 
growing influence in late Qing Dynasty. Official documents cautiously depicted the 
Hui as “uncivilized,” “cruel” and “disobedient,” which respectively referred to their 
adherence to Islam, endurance of hardship, and gregarious lifestyle.31 The Hui’s 
self-segregation in ethnic enclaves was also seen as a great threat to Yunnan’s 
                                                                 







 security, because, as a local official said, “the Muslims have the natural inclination to 
form private cliques and prepare for seditious acts.”32 
The difficulty of classifying the Hui into any established category, as well as the 
anxiety caused by their exotic Muslim traditions, fundamentally shaped the Qing 
Empire’s governing policy toward the ethnic group. On one hand, the government 
attempted to downplay the ethnic uniqueness of Hui by subjecting them to the same 
governing policy as the Han Chinese. Despite being an ethnic minority, the Hui were 
required to register their households and observe Imperial decrees as ordinary 
Chinese subjects. On the other hand, the Qing court had provided various special 
ordinances to punish the undesirable habits of the Hui and restrict their ethnic 
network.33 One ordinance [1763] specified that a Hui who commits a crime is subject 
to harsher punishment than a Han, since “the Hui are naturally disobedient and 
habitually violent (xinqi xinghan, kuangye chengxi) .”34  Another ordinance [1821] 
forbade the Hui to carry a weapon when travelling as groups, by claiming that “the 
Hui’s gregarious behavior and violent nature made them much more dangerous 
than bandits…which deserves great caution.”35 These regulations demonstrated the 
two main purposes of the Qing Dynasty’s Hui policy: to eliminate their ethnic 
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 uniqueness, and to destabilize the internal coherence of the Hui community. 
The Hui’s Clash with An Emerging Chinese Nation 
 By examining the Hui’s development in history, the co-existence of Chinese and 
Muslim characteristics in the Hui’s ethnic makeup was the underlying cause of the 
ethnic hostility between 1821 and 1856. The Hui’s blended identity was viewed as 
antithetical to the homogenous Han society and the Chinese nation-state. Their 
similarities in custom and lifestyle with the Han Chinese allowed them to participate 
as members of Chinese society and increased their visibility to the public as traders, 
merchants and miners. Their frequent interaction with the Han society also made 
their unique ethnic lifestyle conspicuous to a homogenous people and incurred 
considerable anxiety and uneasiness from outside their ethnic enclave. In 
comparison, the unassimilated indigenous groups in Yunnan, due to their secluded 
lifestyle and large cultural difference with the ethnic Han society, remained 
segregated from the mainstream social scene and thus less likely to be the target of 
ethnic hostility. The Hui’s high mobility and visibility did not help them culturally 
integrate into the Han society, but made their outsider characteristics even more 
apparent to the ethnic majority. 
 The court records of ethnic riots substantially support this hypothesis. In the 
ethnic riot of 1821, several Han perpetrators mentioned their discontent with a Hui 
mosque on the main street in the resource-abundant town of Baoshan, stating that 






 in the mosque always showed contemptuous attitude and laughed loudly…Their 
lack of seriousness during the ceremony always infuriated other [Han] 
participants.” 36  In a culturally homogenous society where every member was 
expected to conform to its cultural norm, an ethnic minority’s insensitive response to 
symbolic cultural events was likely to cause misunderstanding and hostility. 
Similarly, the direct cause of the 1845 riot, was an ethnic slur uttered by a Han young 
man in an integrated teahouse. 37 The Hui customers immediately responded by 
more pejorative slurs and incurred an intense verbal exchange between the two 
groups. Although this verbal dispute seemed to be a trivial incident, it nevertheless 
reflected the ingrained cultural misconception between the two groups and 
intensified the situation. Those culturally insensitive events played the role of a 
“cataclysm” that transformed the Han’s latent anti-Hui mentality into violent 
practices. 
Another important contributor to the ethnic riots in Yunnan is the government 
policy. Starting from the late 18 th century, the Imperial Court attempted to 
consolidate its control over frontier territories and converted the decentralized, 
multinational empire to a single nation-state. This power consolidation, known as 
Gaitu Guiliu, took the form of both government coercion and cultural assimilation. In 
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 1724 the government appointed Han Chinese magistrates to oversee the indigenous 
chiefdoms in Yunnan and weakened the autonomous power of local tribal leaders. 
At the same time the government organized mass Han immigration to frontier areas 
to stabilize the ruling order and “civilize” the non-Han native peoples in the 
province. The traditional Hua-Yi ethnic concept was merged with the growing 
awareness of a unitary Chinese nationality, and one’s cultural similarity was 
increasingly connected with one’s political allegiance to the state. In the early 
nineteenth century documents, several new words such as “seditious traitors”, 
“traitors to the Han” or “non-Han traitors” was coined to describe the non-Han 
bandits in Yunnan. The new metaphor suggested a causal relationship between their 
criminal acts and their cultural disobedience to the state. 
In the context of the nation-building process, the Hui’s strong maintenance of 
Muslim customs was not merely considered an exotic cultural practice, but also 
indicated their lack of loyalty to the emerging nation-state. During the ethnic riots, 
the local magistrates played an important role in intensifying the ethnic riot and 
supporting the violence against the Hui. In the 1821 riot, when the Hui community 
leader reported to the local governor the escalation of violence, the local magistrate 
had no formal response to their complaints. One year later, the organized 
counterattack of the Hui against the Han neighborhood was considered as “sedition” 
by the magistrate, who ordered several thousand troopes to suppress the 






 incidents justified the violence of the Han rioters and intensified the ethnic hostility 
between the two groups. 
In conclusion, the antagonistic sentiment toward Hui people reached its peak in 
early 19th century. The hatred toward Hui people was caused by the group’s 
ambiguous ethnic identity. As an assimilated minority group, the Hui adopted 
considerable Chinese characteristics and formed a self-identity as Chinese nationals. 
Their Muslim heritage, however, marked their distinctiveness as an outsider group 
from the Han Chinese perspective and made them subject to negative stereotyping. 
The Hui people’s mixed cultural traits also blurred the ethnic categorization of 
Hua(civilized) and Yi (barbaric), and obstructed the Empire’s modernizing efforts to 
build a nation-state. The hostility between Han and Hui peoples resulted in severe 
ethnic riots in Yunnan and finally led to the Muslim-led Panthay Rebellion against 







 III. The Panthay Rebellion and Ethnic Reconstruction 
The Panthay Rebellion: A Historical Overview 
“Panthay”, a Burmese word borrowed from Chinese word panzei (traitors), was 
used by British observers to name the Hui Muslim uprisings from 1857 to 1871. In 
May 1857, a group of Hui Muslim peasants suddenly stormed Dali, the largest city 
of western Yunnan, due to the rumor that local Han gangsters were planning a 
massacre of all Muslims. Angry Muslims soon occupied the whole city, killed the 
local magistrate, and raised the white flag on the city wall. In the next three days, all 
informed Muslims in Yunnan took up arms and formed a troop of 30,000 people. 
The Governor-General, Shuxing’a, committed suicide after Dali fell into Muslim 
hands. The rebels soon occupied most western Yunnan and marched east toward the 
province capital Kunming. Despite huge casualties on the Hui side, the rebels took 
control of Kunming in 1859 and temporarily drove the imperial force out of the 
province. 
The success of Panthay Rebellion in overthrowing the imperial administration in 
Yunnan gave birth to a new state, the Pingnan State (pingnan guo), led by rebel 
leader Du Wenxiu. The nature of the new regime remains a central question to 
observers. Many Western scholars termed the regime as a “sultanate”, which bears 
the connotation that Panthay State should be viewed as a part of the Islamic world.38 
This argument is intuitively reasonable, given the fact that the regime was founded 
                                                                 






 by, and consisted of, Yunnanese Muslims. However, the major weakness of this 
view is that the Panthay regime lacks most typical features of an Islamic state: the 
clerics had no influence over the state affairs, no Sharia law is imposed on its 
subjects, and the Muslim leaders never adopted Islamic-style honorifics (sultan or 
caliph) for their leadership position. During the regime’s 14 years of existence, its 
politics remained secular in general, and its institutional structure observed a clear 
separation of church and state. 
Another major view, mostly accepted by Chinese and Taiwanese scholars, 
claims that the Panthay state is no different than other contemporary peasant rebel 
regimes in restive 19th-century China. Similar to the Taiping Rebellion in Canton 
and the Nian Militias in the Chinese Far West, the Panthay rebellion is just another 
angry reaction of Chinese peasants against the corrupt imperial rule. This view 
underplayed the rebels’ Muslim character and emphasized their economic status as 
underprivileged peasants. However, the Panthay rebellion differs remarkably from 
typical peasant rebellions in two aspects. First, the cause of the Hui’s rebellion is not 
economic hardship, but ethnic intolerance agitated by the Imperial Court and local 
Han militia. Second, the major leaders of the Panthay regime came from the local 
intellectual class, most of which received formal education in both Confucian and 
Muslim way. Suleiman Du Wenxiu, the regime’s supreme leader, held an imperial 






 conception that Panthay Rebellion is a “peasant revolt” apparently oversimplified 
the real scenario. 
The preserved written evidence of the Panthay State, although limited in 
number, can be used to restore the political institution of the regime. 39 These sources 
include 1) official documents, such as decrees and resolutions issued by Du Wenxiu 
and his military government; 2) private letters, especially those between senior Hui 
officials, military leaders and local elders; 3) diaries and records written by local 
intellectuals, including ethnic Han and Hui, residing in the Muslim-controlled 
region between 1857 and 1871. Unfortunately, most written evidence was destroyed 
by the Qing officials immediately after the Panthay defeat in 1872, and those 
documents preserved today can scarcely reflect the entire scenario of the short-lived 
regime. But a careful review of those available sources can offer us valuable 
information about the political agenda of the newly-founded regime. 
This chapter discusses three important findings that will contribute to the study 
of Panthay political structures. 40 First of all, the Hui Muslims did not monopolize 
the political power of the rebellious province. The regime’s leadership was ethnically 
inclusive, where all three ethnicities – Han, Hui and Yi peoples – are represented in 
the new authority. More surprisingly, the supreme leader, Suleiman Du Wenxiu, is 
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 not an ethnic Hui, but a half-Han Chinese adopted and raised in a Muslim family. 
Among the rank-and-file soldiers in the rebellious army, Han Chinese and 
indigenous Yi people constituted the majority of the military force. Based on these 
facts, the perceived conception that Panthay Rebellion is an ethnic uprising of Hui 
people in Yunnan is questionable. 
          Ethnic issues, which triggered the outbreak of the Panthay Rebellion, 
continued to be an important problem for the rebel leaders. Since the Panthay 
rebellion is initially a Muslim reaction to the Han militia’s violence, many 
anticipated that that the new regime would launch a bloody counterattack against 
the Han Chinese. Many Han landlords, especially those involved in Anti-Hui revolts, 
were prepared to escape the province to prevent a Muslim revenge. The Panthay 
authorities attempted to pacify the public‘s anxiety by clarifying that the rebellion 
was not anti-Han in nature. The Generalissimo argued that the Han and Hui were 
originally “brothers and friends”, but the Qing court intentionally instigated the 
mutual hatred between two peoples and was responsible for the tragedy. Since both 
Han and Hui were victims of the government misdeeds, the mission of this rebellion 
should be overthrowing the corrupt government and reuniting two peoples under 
one union. This explanation blamed the government, instead of the Han Chinese, for 
causing the ethnic conflict and gained much support from local Han population. 
          Another important finding is that despite the rebellion’s non-Han nature, the 






 province. The official proclamation claimed that although the Han and Hui were 
two “religions”, they are both Chinese subjects and obliged to save China from the 
Manchu Empire’s barbaric rule. The Panthay regime adopted a wide range of 
traditional Chinese symbols, including clothing style, flags and calligraphy, to 
distinguish it from the ethnic Manchu patterns of Qing Dynasty. On many occasions 
the Panthay leaders also publicly stated the rebellion’s mission as “reviving China 
and destroying the barbarians (Quchu Dalu, Huifu Zhonghua )”. By embracing 
Chinese nationalism the Panthay leaders attempted to strengthen the regime’s 
cultural orthodoxy to govern a predominately Han province. 
The third finding is that, according to existing documents, the Panthay regime’s 
political institution shows remarkable Chinese characteristics. The Panthay authority 
borrowed the government structure of Han Dynasty – the strongest dynasty in 
Chinese history. The official titles of Panthay bureaucrats, such as Silu, Sima or 
Sikong, were archaic Chinese honorifics existing only in Classical Confucian books. 
However, the Panthay polity also showed many innovative features. The regime 
was not a monarchy in which the Generalissimo had absolute power; instead, a 
deliberative council (yishi tang) consisted of civil and military leaders collectively 
made important decisions. This decision-making body closely resembled the way 
village elders in Yunnan decided local affairs. All those evidence showed that the 
Panthay regime was not a “Sultanate” which showed no significant characteristic of 






 Why did the Panthay State, a short-lived regime founded by rebellious Muslims, 
contain so many apparent Chinese features? In order to answer this question, one 
should again understand the Hui Muslim’s ambiguous dual identity. To most Hui, 
Islam faith is just a personal faith practiced in the private sphere, but never a 
political ideal that should be promoted in the society. As a result of 800-year 
assimilation, the Hui never saw their Islamic faith as antithetical to their political 
identity as Chinese nationals. The Panthay leader’s adoption of Chinese governing 
model was also a practical strategy. Given that the majority of Yunnan residents 
were ethnic Han Chinese, it is necessary for Muslim leaders to gain popular support 
by respecting their political tradition. Therefore, the Panthay regime’s lack of Islamic 
features is nothing but reasonable. 
This chapter will use both primary and secondary evidence to strengthen this 
argument. The primary sources include the archival records of Panthay State, 
including proclamations, appointment letters and legal codes between 1857 and 1871; 
the secondary resources includes historians’ narratives, both by the Chinese and 
foreigners, in different time periods. Among all the precedent research, Bai Shouyi’s 
Huimin Qiyi (The Muslim Rebellion) and David Atwill’s Chinese Sultanate provided 
the most comprehensive resources and are cited most frequently. In order to prevent 
repetition, the “Panthays”, “Huis” and “Chinese Muslims” are roughly synonyms 







 The Ethnic Makeup of the Panthay Regime 
           Most previous observers considered the Panthay Rebellion as an ethnic revolt 
by Hui minorities against the dominant Han population. John Anderson (1876), the 
earliest chronicler of Chinese Muslims, depicted the rebellions as “a Mohammadan 
riot against the Chinese who were threatening the Panthay town”. 41 The rebellion 
gave rise to a “Mohammadan king”, Du Wenxiu, who “hold his court in Dali”. Bai 
Shouyi (1956) also defined the Panthay Rebellion as a “Hui peasants’ col lective 
resistance against the Han landlords”. 42  These views perceived the Panthay 
Rebellion simply as a Hui-versus-Han conflict where only two ethnic groups 
involved. 
 More recent research showed a different perspective. David Atwill (2006) argues 
that the Panthay Rebellion cannot be explained solely in an ethnic context. Atwill 
marked the difference between new Han immigrants who came in the 19 th century 
and local Han inhabitants who resided in Yunnan for generations. He argues that 
the rebellion is a response to the aggressive behavior of new Han “colonizers”, 
rather than the Han population who coexisted peacefully with other groups.  43 He 
also found that the Panthay Rebellion is a multiethnic involvement where many 
ethnic groups joined the Muslims in the resistance. Li Wenxue, an ethnic Yi 
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 (“barbarian”) who suffered from Han occupation of his land, led his indigenous 
tribesmen join the rebellion and pledged allegiance to Du Wenxiu. 44 Atwill even 
found many impoverished Han peasants who chose to join the Muslim rebels as a 
way of survival.45 Therefore, Atwill defined the rebellion as multiethnic rather than 
a Hui-against-Han ethnic riot. 
 On the individual level, the ethnic identity of Hui rebel leaders was also 
ambiguous. Many Western resources refers to the rebellion’s major leader, Du 
Wenxiu, as “Sultan”, an Islamic title that suggested his undoubtable Muslim identity. 
A brief survey into his family background and early life will greatly undermine this 
statement. Contrary to the wide conception that he is a Hui, Du’s biological parents 
were both Han Chinese. His father died shortly after his mother became pregnant, 
and he was born into a Muslim family since his mother remarried a Hui tradesman. 
As a stepchild, he is given the Muslim last name Yang and an Arabic name Suleiman 
by an imam of a local mosque. Although a Muslim, he received Confucian-style 
education at a traditional Chinese academy (xiangxue) and showed great talent in 
classical Chinese literature. 
 Du Wenxiu’s early adulthood witnessed a gradual awareness of his Han 
Chinese legacy. At the age of eighteen he passed the local examination and achieved 
the scholar’s degree (xiucai). His academic achievement made him proud of his 
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 ancestral legacy, and he changed his family name to Du, the family name of his Han 
Chinese ancestors. He also worshipped the ancestral graveyards to honor his 
ancestral lineage – a traditional ritual for new-elected scholar-bureaucrats.46 Du’s 
recognition of Han Chinese legacy had never affected his strong self-identity as an 
ethnic Hui and a Muslim, but his hybrid cultural background had prevented him 
from seeing Han and Hui as two distinctive and adversary groups.  
 Another important rebel leader, Ma Rulong, also had an interesting biography 
that also showed a certain level of ethnic ambiguity. Ma was the second -highest 
commander of the Panthay troop before he defected to the Qing army in 1861. He 
came from a noble origin whose ancestors served the Chinese emperor as a court 
guard in Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). He was ambitious to serve in the Imperial Army 
and obtained the first rank in the Imperial military exam, but the increasing Han 
assault of his local community forced him to join the rebel force. He expressed a 
different ethnic view and disputed the cause of rebellion in his 1862 letter to Du 
Wenxiu. He believed that Hui and Han were “one people only divided by their 
religious beliefs”, rather than two hostile ethnic groups. He also expressed his 
loyalty to the empire and argued that the rebellion is only a “defensive action” 
against local Han bandits rather than a revolution against Han Chinese in generals. 
He persuaded Du to prevent the escalation of the conflict and surrender to the 
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 imperial force “as soon as possible”. His opinion represented the views of many Hui 
rebels --- that the rebellion should be a resistance to local injustice rather than an 
ethnic revenge against a hostile people.47 
 On the level of rank-and-file insurgents, there is no accurate data showing what 
portion of the rebel force are ethnic Hui Muslims. However, most sources indicate 
that the Panthay soldiers were multiethnic in a large degree. Atwill (2006) and Bai 
(1952) both cited a significant number of non-Muslim indigenous people, such as Yi, 
Bai and Hmong, led by indigenous chieftain Li Wenxue, to join the rebellion. Lin’s 
research (2001) cited a decree that allows Han soldiers to consume swine in a 
separate camp from the Muslims, which shows that a certain number of Han 
Chinese existed in the rebel force. These sporadic sources all suggested the ethnic 
diversity among the rank-and-file combatants. 
 From this perspective, the traditional view accepted by Western scholars--- that 
Panthay Rebellion was an extension of historical Han-Hui conflicts and aimed to 
establish an Islamic Sultanate --- is questionable. The rebellion’s leadership did not 
have a strong ethnic consciousness, and its participants were composed of multiple 
ethnicity. If ethnic hatred was not the actual cause, then what motivated the people 
to take up arms? What political agenda did the rebels aim to achieve by this uprising? 
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 An appropriate answer to this question will depend on the existent written sources 
of during the Panthay Rebellion. 
Leading Ideology of the Panthay Rebellion 
 If the Panthay rebellion, as elaborated in the previous chapter, is not an 
ethnically-oriented conflict, what ideology did the rebels use to justify their defiance 
of imperial rule? A study of Panthay-era written records lead to a surprising finding: 
the Panthay leaders used Chinese nationalism as the rebellion’s ideological 
foundation. The rebels repeatedly claimed that the Manchu Dynasty was a “tartar 
barbarian” regime that had no legitimacy to rule, and the rebellion’s ultimate goal 
was to restore the Chinese civilization from the suppressive Manchu rulers. 48 An 
important question then rises: how can the rebels justify their claim of Chinese 
sovereignty, when the majority of them were actually non-Han? Some Panthay 
documents showed how a non-Han regime reconcile the inconsistency between their 
non-Han identity and the rebellion’s nationalist goals. 
 One remarkable document, The Muslim’s Proclamation of War in Jianshui 
(Jianshui Huimin Xiwen) stated in the beginning paragraph that 
 
 …We the Muslims, no different than Han Chinese, are granted 
good nature by Heaven. We have adopted the Central Kingdom’s 
civilization for a long time. Since the beginning of the dynasty, we 
produced countless loyal courtiers and model children in the 
                                                                 
48 “Xingshi Xiwen”, Bai Shouyi and Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1951. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The Muslim 






 nation’s long history…
49 
 
 This statement attempts to broaden the ethnic category of “Chinese” and 
argue that Hui Muslims are no different than Han Chinese in their cultural heritage. 
By emphasizing Hui’s long history of assimilation, the rebel leaders attempt to 
justify that Hui and Han are both legitimate heirs of the Chinese civilization. 
Therefore, when Chinese civilization is endangered, the Hui also shares the 
obligation to save China’s cultural authenticity from barbarian rules. 
 Many war proclamations (xiwen) issued by Panthay regime showed similar 
rhetoric that the Hui bear the moral obligation to rescue China from barbarian rule. 
An 1861 proclamation openly claims that  
 The goal of this offensive is to revive the Han; therefore, no 
killing of civilians should be conducted. If the troop meet Han 
people on the way, we should clarify our missions and gain their 
support. It is necessary to unite Han and Hui to take revenge 
against the Qing.50 
 Those Panthay-era documents showed a mixed view of disdain and sympathy 
toward the Han population --- disdain for their collaboration with the Qing rulers in 
massacring the Muslims, and sympathy for their subordinate status under a 
barbarian empire. Some Panthay writings even depicted the rebellion as the Hui’s 
heavenly mandate – a mission to enlighten the Han Chinese and help them restore 
the Chinese civilization from the ruins.  
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  Du Wenxiu’s personal records, including some unpublished manuscripts, 
frequently reflected his ambition to revive the Han national spirit. A calligraphy 
hanged in his study reads: 51 
What a hero I am, sent by Heaven, to restore the Chinese land! 
天降英雄挽回中华世界 
What a hero I am, dispatched by the Earth, to overthrow the Tartar’s reign! 
地遣豪杰踏破胡儿乾坤 
 Du Wenxiu’s another calligraphy scroll, initially a gift to his cousin-in-law, 
expressed his political platform more explicitly: 
   联回、汉为一体  To unite Hui and Han as one, 
   驱除鞑虏    To expel the Tartar barbarians, 
   恢复中华    To revitalize China52 
 These writings clearly demonstrate Du Wenxiu’s self-conception as a savior of 
all Chinese people sent by Heaven, who bears the responsibility to restore Chinese 
civilization from tyranny. It is worth noted that “to expel the Tartar barbarians” later 
became a popular nationalist slogan used by anti-Qing revolutionaries, which was 
famously adopted by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925) during the 1912 Revolution. The 
Confucian idea of “Heavenly Mandate” effectively resolved the inconsistency 
between the Panthay’s non-Chinese ethnicity and their claim of Chinese sovereignty. 
The rebels believed that since the Han Chinese was incapable of restoring their lost 
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 land and civilization, the Heaven had transferred this obligation to the Hui – a 
non-Han group yet an equal subject of China. 
 The cultural symbolism used by the rebel army also reflected their attempt to 
reconstruct a “real” Chinese identity. The rebel leaders claimed to adopt the clothing 
of Ming Dynasty --- the last Han-dominated regime in Chinese history. A local 
historian recorded that “the Muslims… cut off their hair queues, burned their 
Manchu ropes, and put on Ming-era white ropes which was forbidden after the 
Manchu takeover...” The change of clothing style was considered by rebel leaders as 
a “return to cultural authenticity (huifu zhengsu)” and a rejection of Qing Dynasty’s 
legitimacy. 
 Besides the nationalist ideology, the Hui rebels also uses the Qing Dynasty’s 
bad governance to justify their uprising against the empire. The rebels’ political 
writings include a pervasive condemnation of the Qing court’s corruptive rule, 
including its inability to resist foreign invasion, heavy taxation, and suppressive 
social policy. The rebel leadership claimed that, since the Qing court imposed so 
much suffering on the people, it had lost its legitimacy to govern China.  
 The most remarkable evidence of this ideology is a handmade diagram of early 
Panthay leaders, titled “Situation of Manchu Empire”. The diagram showed a circle 
divided into four parts, each of which displays the words “frequent foreign 
aggression”, “an incapable emperor ”, “a corrupt bureaucracy of thieves” and “an 






 circle, which reads “a doomed country and a suffering people”. The diagram also 
provide the solution to the crisis, which is “a people’s revolution”. This diagram 
demonstrated the Hui’s strong discontent of the regime’s dysfunction and their 
resolution to rebuild a well-governed polity through revolutionary means. This 
diagram also showed the Hui’s perception that their sufferings are caused by the 
Imperial Court rather than local magistrates. Compared to previous small-scale 
ethnic riots, this rebellion pursued a larger political agenda --- the overthrow of Qing 
court nationwide. (See photo below) 
 
“Situation of the Manchu Empire”, a graph made by Du Wenxiu, photographed by Qian Jingyuan in August 
19, 2013, exhibition at PMD Yunnan. 
 In their official propaganda, the Panthay rebels repeatedly mentioned the 






 Proclamation to Yunnan Residents”, General Ma Rulong compared the local 
bureaucrats as “dogs and mice” who “abuse their powers to achieve personal gains 
regardless of the survival of people.” He also pointed out that local bureaucrats 
“manipulated the public sentiment … and caused Han and Hui, two brotherly 
peoples, to fight under one roof ”. Du Wenxiu’s military declaration Xinshi Xiwen 
also made a smiliar statement that “The suffering people were in an urgent state, but 
the demonic bureaucrats still led comfortable and luxious lives, as if nothing had 
happened… They abandon the people like throwing a rubbish.”53 
 Following their accusation of Qing bureaucrats, the Panthays then publicly 
promised to build a better government to improve the well-being of local people. In 
the Xingshi Xiwen (Announcement of Military Discharge), Du Wenxiu publicly 
stated that “after our heroic military pacified the area…the peace and happiness of 
the people will be better preserved…” 54  General Ma Rulong, in his “Public 
Proclamation to Yunnan Residents”, also expressed his plan to establish good 
governance in the province. The document began by an accusation of local 
bureaucrats for “harassing the innocent civilians and disturbing social virtue”. It 
declared the rebel’s commitment to promote social justice and exterminate “the 
chronic disease of the province’s governance”.55 
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  The Panthay’s claim to improve people’s livelihood was not simply a 
propaganda, however. In Du Wenxiu’s private letter to his distant cousin Yang 
Zhengpeng, the leader elaborated his policy agenda for relieving taxation, reducing 
corruption and maintaining public order, as a “strategy to gain public support for 
our revolutionary cause”. A Panthay-era military brochure demonstrated the rebel’s 
efforts to protect the local livelihood. It provided death penalty for “disturbing local 
peace”, including raping, robbing and breaking into private homes. It even specified 
that if a family have economic hardship, the young man in the army does not need 
to serve in the Hui military. By constructing the rebellion as a justified response to 
government misbehavior, the Panthay rebels managed to seek legitimacy on the 
moral grounds. 
 Based on these written sources of Panthay Yunnan, it is clear that although 
Han-Hui ethnic conflict remarkably influenced the outbreak of the Panthay 
Rebellion, the insurgents did not have an obvious political agenda on ethnicity. 
Instead, the rebellion showed a significant extent of ethnic diversity and included 
members from Han, Hui and Yi groups. The leadership also understated the rebel’s 
predominantly non-Han identity and employed extensive Confucian ideology to 
justify their uprising as an act to preserve Chinese civilization and livelihood. Given 
these facts, to term this uprising as a “Muslim rebellion” is obviously a misnomer 
and a cultural prejudice. 







 The Political Institutions of the Panthay State 
  Another significant topic of the Panthay rebellion is the foundation of 
Pingnan State (pingnan guo), a newborn separatist regime founded by rebels in their 
occupied areas. The political structure of Pingnan State is closely associated with the 
rebel force, due to the consistent warfare between rebels and imperial troops in the 
regime’s 14-year life. Is this regime a “Sultanate” ruled by Muslims founded in 
Islamic tradition, as claimed by Western researchers such as Rocher, Anderson and 
Atwill? A brief review of primary sources will provide some hints on the regime’s 
political structure and help answer this question. 
 The Pingnan regime was officially founded in 1856, shortly after Du Wenxiu’s 
troops successfully occupied the city of Dali, the largest city in western Yunnan. He 
conferred the city residents and officially accepted the title “General issimo of All 
Armed Forces and Calvary” (zongtong bingma dayuanshuai). Although his 
administration was informally referred as “Pingnan State”, he never considered 
himself as the leader of a separate country, but rather as the legitimate leader of all 
Chinese people. In a diplomatic note to the British Governor of Burma, he styled 
himself as “Du Wenxiu, Generalissimo of China” to claim his status as the sovereign 
of the entire Central Kingdom . In Du’s inaugural address, he claimed Heaven’s 
mandate and pledged allegiance to ancient Chinese sages of Yao and Shun. Du 






 not suggest strong Islamic traits.56 
 However, some of Panthay symbols contained certain Muslim elements. One 
significant feature is that the official seal of Du Wenxiu was rendered in both 
Chinese and Arabic. The Chinese text wrote “Generalissimo Du of All Armed Forces 
and Calvary”, while the Arabic text showed his title as “Leader of All Muslims” 
(Qa’id Jami al-muslimin). The Arabic script on Du’s seal was frequently cited as an 
evidence that Pingnan Regime was an “Islamic sultanate”. However, this argument 
ignored the fact that Du Wenxiu, the owner of the seal, was illiterate in Arabic and 
only used Arabic calligraphy as a decoration. In most Panthay government decrees 
and court verdicts, Classical Chinese was the only language that appeared on the 
paper, while Arabic was never used as a working language except for important 
religious occasions. Some evidence even showed that Du Wenxiu rarely used that 
seal --- in an appointment letter issued in 1862, he used his signature instead of his 
seal to authorize the document. Therefore, the half-Arabic signature alone cannot 
suggest his political status as an Islamic leader.57 
Although the Panthay regime was headed by Hui military leaders, it also 
included a large civil bureaucracy in charge of domestic affairs. A complete list of 
civil officials in the Panthay regime, compiled by Bai Shouyi, showed two important 
features of the bureaucracy. The first feature is that Han Chinese composed the 
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 absolute majority of the administration. Among the 195 senior officials appointed by 
Du Wenxiu, 176 people were ethnic Han Chinese and 19 were Hui Muslims.58 Du 
openly emphasized the need to include Han Chinese into the regime, by claiming 
that “we need to build trust and emotional ties among the large Han population of 
Yunnan”. Another feature is the high level of autonomy on the regional level. Many 
sources show that the Panthay administration did not change the political structure 
on the county level. The county magistrates appointed by Qing court, as long as they 
pledged allegiance to the Generalissimo, were allowed to retain their regional power. 
Du Wenxiu also issued patents to indigenous chiefs, which guaranteed their right to 
govern themselves and their obligation to pay taxes and provide soldiers.  
Based on these limited sources, the Panthay political institution seemed to be 
secular, decentralized, and generally multiethnic. Although the regime’s major 
leaders were Hui Muslims, they did not intend transform Yunnan society into an 
Islamic one. As an ethnic minority ruling a predominantly Han province, the 
Panthay leaders adopted a pragmatic ruling approach and maintained the 
established order on the regional level. The view that Du Wenxiu’s regime was a 
“sultanate” that attempted to Islamize Yunnan, therefore, lacked historical validity. 
IV. Conclusion 
This research attempts to answer one central question: why did the Panthay 
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 Rebellion – a massive revolt of Hui Muslims against the Han-dominated society, take 
place in the 19th-century Yunnan? Instead of seeing this incident as an isolated ethnic 
conflict, this study focuses on ethnic identity and explores how one group views the 
other in its own cultural context. On one hand, the Hui people strived to be 
recognized as a member of the Han Chinese society while maintaining their unique 
Muslim characteristics. On the other hand, the ethnic view of Han Chinese only 
defined a person as either Han or non-Han and cannot accept a group that possess 
both familiar and unfamiliar traits. Therefore, Hui’s increasing involvement in Han 
Chinese society only caused the Han population’s anxiety and violent response to 
this imagined enemy. 
Following the outbreak of Panthay Rebellion and subsequent establishment of 
the new regime, the Hui leaders attempted to reconstruct the definition of ethnicity 
in Yunnan. The regime reconstructed the concept “Chinese” as one including both 
Han and Hui peoples, who shared the common experience of suffering under 
Manchu’s barbaric rule. The Panthay leaders also highlighted the Hui’s responsibility 
as Chinese subjects to restore China from Qing Dynasty rule. In general, the Panthay 
rebellion was the Hui’s attempt integrate their ethnic identity into the 
Han-dominated society. This research is a preliminary and immature attempt to 
examine the role of identity in ethnic conflict, but it will hopefully serve as the entry 








I sincerely thank Professor Tam, my project advisor, for his scholastic guidance, 
valuable suggestions and personal mentorship during my research. I wholeheartedly 
appreciate the efforts made by members of the reviewing committee, Professors 
Peter Weisensel and Ernesto Capello, to read and review this research paper. I 
deeply thank Professors Karin Vélez for her innumerable efforts in improving the 
first chapter of my research paper, Professor Jamie Monson for her generous help in 
the funding of this project, and Professor Igor Tchoukarine for providing a map 










“A Chronicle of Hui Rebellion in Yunnan (Dianhui Jiluan, 滇回纪乱)”, Weishan Hui 
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